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CITY OF LOS ANGELES v. ALAMEDA: THE FRACTURED EVIDENCE
STANDARD FOR PROVING A SUBSTANTIAL GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
Christopher A. Khatami

I. Introduction
Fractured cases make bad evidence law. In City of Los Angeles v. Alameda,1 the United
States Supreme Court achieved minor success in clarification. The Alameda Court’s plurality
opinion created a more concrete analytic framework in which to view both parties’ evidence, but
produced an opaque rule as to how a court should determine the sufficiency of that evidence.2
Alameda generated more sophisticated evidence questions than it laid to rest in response to the
inchoate reasonable-relevance standard established in Renton for proving a substantial
governmental interest.3 A fractured Alameda opinion and unclear evidence rules created
conflicting lower court interpretations, causing circuit courts to render its own interpretative
judgment where the Alameda Court failed to clarify.
Lower courts have split over key evidence questions.4 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits are
divided over whether studies with a longer shelf life, often having tested for unrelated secondary
effects, constitute “shoddy data or reasoning” under Alameda.5 Another circuit split in the wake
of Alameda turns on whether a city can rely only on pre-enactment data or can the city rely on
1

535 U.S. 425 (2002).
Daniel R. Aaronson, Gary S. Edinger, James S. Benjamin, The First Amendment in Chaos: How the Law of
Secondary Effects Is Applied and Misapplied by the Circuit Courts, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 741, 755 (2009) (finding
that lower courts agree that Alameda’s evidence standard does not require local governments to rely on Daubertquality scientific evidence or studies, but that there is no lower court consensus or guidance from Alameda as to the
weight or form of evidence sufficient to “cast direct doubt” on legislative findings that support the government’s
secondary effects justification for state regulation of adult businesses).
3
Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, supra note 2, at 755.
4
Id. at 750.
5
Brigman L. Harman, Is a Strip Club More Harmful Than a Dirty Bookstore? Navigating a Circuit Split in
Municipal Regulation of Sexually Oriented Businesses, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1603, 1604–06 (2008) (noting that the
Fifth Circuit has interpreted “shoddy data or reasoning” under Alameda to mean that cities cannot rely on “studies
that do not differentiate between on-site sexually oriented businesses and off-site sexually oriented businesses.”).
The Tenth Circuit, on the contrary, has read “shoddy data or reasoning” more conservatively. Id. Under the Tenth
Circuit’s view, the plaintiff retains the burden of rebutting the presumption that on-site and off-site sexually oriented
businesses are “‘reasonably similar businesses’ that will have reasonably similar effects.” This circuit split will be
discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this paper. Id.
2

1

data compiled after enactment of the ordinance.6 Still another division answered differently
within the same circuit hinges on whether foreign studies “trump actual local experience
measured with reliable statistics?”7 More post-Alameda questions still persist: the extent of
judicial deference to legislative evidence and the evidentiary weight to be afforded local
scientific studies in comparison to older anecdotal accounts from other jurisdictions which “may
or may not have much in common with the community at issue.”8
The Alameda Court succeeded, however, in creating a burden-shifting mechanism and a
balancing test designed to afford plaintiffs an opportunity to rebut the city’s asserted evidence of
secondary effects at the summary judgment stage of litigation.9 The balancing test sought to
create a boundary framework to address First Amendment concerns raised in Justice Souter’s
dissent in Alameda.10
Justice O’Connor’s formulation of the burden shifting standard failed to articulate with
greater precision and clarity the weight and form of evidence that cities are required to produce
in support of the link between asserted secondary effects and the ordinance’s restrictions.11 Only
spare mention of “shoddy data or reasoning” is offered as the blanket standard for unpalatable
government evidence.12 The plurality opinion, however, jettisoned elaboration of any kind as to
the types of evidence constituting “shoddy data or reasoning.”13
Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s balancing test took a different analytical approach to reach
the same conclusion with the same evidentiary flaws as the plurality opinion. The concurrence
6

Aaronson, Edinger, and Benjamin, supra note 2, at 756–58 (noting that the “timing of secondary effects evidence
has also hopelessly divided the Courts.”) Some courts have concluded that the government must produce all
evidence relied upon at any time and at any stage of the litigation. Id at 758. Other courts, however, have held that
the city must produce all evidence “made at the time of legislative enactment.” These circuit cases and the timing of
evidence issue will be discussed in Part IV of this paper. Id.
7
Id. at 756.
8
Id. at 753–55.
9
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438–39 (2002) (plurality opinion).
10
Id. at 446 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
11
Id. at 437 (plurality opinion).
12
Id.
13
Id.
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also failed to articulate the weight of evidence and the form of evidence required to be produced
under Alameda. The burden-shifting mechanism fits hand in glove with the balancing test, but
neither approach has proven instructive to lower courts on crucial evidence rules at the trial level.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have read Alameda as permitting considerable judicial
deference to legislative findings of asserted secondary effects in a line of cases to be discussed
further in this paper. A much more recent Seventh Circuit decision in Annex Books, Inc. v. City
of Indianapolis,14 however, retrenched a hitherto expansive reading of what evidence sufficiently
sustained an adult zoning ordinance.
The Annex Court rejected the city’s reliance on a data from a pre-enactment study
conducted twenty years prior that tested for secondary effects unrelated to the ordinance at
issue.15 Applying the burden-shift and balancing approaches, the Annex Court read Alameda’s
“shoddy data or reasoning” standard as including data from studies unrelated to the asserted
secondary effects.16 Annex, in other words, undergirded evidentiary sufficiency with the
requirement that proffered evidence must be at least comparably related to the types of land-use
externalities produced by operation of adult businesses.
This paper argues that the Alameda Court’s fractured opinion left the sufficiency of
evidence standard an unsettled area of law susceptible to unbridled legislative justifications for
invasive adult zoning restrictions unrelated to purported secondary effects. Part II of this paper
examines the broader constitutional landscape from which the sufficiency of evidence standard
and the stakes surrounding it emerged. Part III provides a case analysis of Alameda, scrutinizes
the three contending approaches of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Part IV analyzes
evidentiary issues raised in Alameda that caused circuit splits and whether the Seventh Circuit’s

14

581 F.3d 460, 461–63 (7th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 461.
16
Id. at 464–66.
15
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decision in Annex constituted a game-changer for evidentiary sufficiency. Part V briefly argues
that an evidence rule of comparable relatedness to asserted secondary effects is a vital safeguard
that precludes city councils from abusing studies and other data to support unrelated ordinances
in the name of combating secondary effects. Lastly, Part VI concludes that Alameda’s fogginess
empowers city councils to surmount First Amendment challenges without allowing plaintiffbusiness owners the benefit of making their case for constitutional defect beyond the summary
judgment stage of litigation.
II. Constitutional Framework: Zoning Regulation of Adult Businesses and the First Amendment
State zoning regulation of adult businesses is a creature of nuisance law. State and
municipal governments retain broad zoning authority to regulate adult business establishments
subject to certain First Amendment limitations.17 First Amendment limitation on state police
power encompasses protection over a “wide variety of ‘expressive conduct,’ including adult
entertainment.”18 Supreme Court decisions have consistently extended First Amendment
protections to adult books, sexually explicit movies, and live adult entertainment.19
The ambit of First Amendment protection of adult businesses in zoning and non-zoning
cases alike has been frustrated by analytical difficulties in drawing sharp pliable distinctions

17

See, e.g., Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1971) (holding that zoning regulations must be content-neutral in their
application and not infringe on speech protected by the First Amendment); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941) (holding that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon First Amendment speech are permissible
as long as the regulations are administered fairly); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(holding that the state’s police power is broad enough to allow government zoning regulation that segregates
industrial company sites from residential areas of the community); see also Shima Baradaran-Robison, Viewpoint
Neutral Zoning of Adult Entertainment Businesses, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 451 (2004) (explaining that the
recognized power of local governments to enact zoning ordinances to combat nuisances has been broadly interpreted
by the Supreme Court to include zoning for aesthetic reasons, improvements to neighborhood quality and urban life,
reduction in noise, traffic, and crime, and protection of public morals); Kenneth L. Turchi, Note, Municipal Zoning
Restrictions on Adult Entertainment: Young, Its Progeny, and Indianapolis’ Special Exception Ordinance, 58 IND.
L.J. 505, 506–10 (1983) (describing constitutional background for state zoning regulatory authority over businesses
in the community and the basic limits of that regulatory authority as it confronts, generally speaking, First
Amendment concerns).
18
Baradaran-Robison, supra note 17, at 451.
19
See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (citing a litany of prior Supreme Court cases
that recognized extensions of First Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech through a variety of
communicative mediums such as television, radio, print, and live entertainment).

4

between expressive conduct and speech content.20 The Supreme Court first confronted this
conduct-content bifurcation in U.S. v. O’Brien.21 The facts of O’Brien, however, do not lend
themselves to easy analogy in the context of zoning adult businesses. O’Brien involved three
defendants who burned their “Selective Service registration certificates,” or draft cards, on the
steps of a local city courthouse in protest of the Vietnam War and in violation of a 1965
amendment to a federal statute.22 The statutory amendment imposed criminal liability on anyone
who “‘knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates’” a draft card.23
The defendants challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, claiming that the act
or conduct of burning a draft card in public fell within the First Amendment’s protection of free
expression “because [the defendants] did it in ‘demonstration against the war and against the
draft.’”24 The Supreme soundly rejected the notion that all conduct containing a communicative
element that could be labeled as speech received First Amendment protection.25 Speech and nonspeech elements combined in the same course of conduct are still subject to incidental First
Amendment limitations if the restrictive law meets a four-part test adopted by the O’Brien
Court.26
Government regulation of expressive conduct is “sufficiently justified” if: 1) it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; 2) if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; 3) if it the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and 4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater

20

See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 457 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that
“[a]dult speech refers not merely to sexually explicit content, but to speech reflecting a favorable view of being
explicit about sex and a favorable view of the practices it depicts”); see also Philip J. Prygoski, Content Neutrality
and Levels of Scrutiny in First Amendment Zoning Cases, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2003).
21
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 374.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
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than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”27 Although the Court categorized the
defendant’s conduct as expressive, it concluded that Congress retained the proper authority to
pass a draft card burning statute under its Article I constitutional power to raise armies.28 In
addition, the government’s substantial interest resided in furthering “the smooth and proper
functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise armies.”29 The draft card burning
statute protects the government’s capability to control a functioning military conscription system
essential to national defense.30 Accordingly, the draft card burning statute is unrelated to
suppressing any speech aspect of the conduct and the Court “perceived no reasonable alternative
means that would more precisely and narrowly” assure the functional viability of the draft
system.31
O’Brien essentially provided that government regulation of expressive conduct is
content-neutral if the government can meet each prong of the four-part test.32 The factors in the
O’Brien test for expressive conduct statutes are closely analogous to the multi-factor analysis the
Supreme Court developed for determining whether zoning ordinances are content-based or
content-neutral.33 Unlike the O’Brien Court’s clear adoption of a test to determine a statute’s

27

Id. at 374–77.
Id. at 377.
29
Id. at 379.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 379–81.
32
Interestingly, by contrast, the Supreme Court refused to apply the four-part O’Brien test to a Congressional flag
burning statute in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), finding that the flag burning ban was content-based and
subject to strict scrutiny despite the fact that the act of flag burning was expressive conduct that would otherwise
come under O’Brien. See Dana M. Tucker, Preventing The Secondary Effects of Adult Entertainment
Establishments: Is Zoning the Solution?, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 383, 395 (1987).
33
Christopher J. Andrew, Note, The Secondary Effects Doctrine: The Historical Development, Current Application,
and Potential Mischaracterization of an Elusive Judicial Precedent, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2002) (noting
that the Supreme Court has “commented that the tests regarding time, place, and manner restrictions and expressive
conduct restrictions are nearly identical, and appears to use them interchangeably with only minor amounts of
difficulty”). It is important to note, however, that the majority opinions have applied the Renton test to zoning cases
only, and applied the O’Brien test to expressive conduct cases involving public indecency statutes banning nude
dancing a la Barnes and Erie. Where the different tests seem to converge is in the Court’s application of the
secondary effects doctrine as legal justification for expressive conduct statutes regulating adult businesses.
28
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content-neutrality, however, the Supreme Court hiccupped twice before it developed a multifactor test similar to O’Brien.
Confronted with its first adult zoning case in Young v. American Mini Theatres,34 the
Court sharply divided over the proper standard of review and whether the enterprise of adult
zoning was content-based or content-neutral.35 The facts in Young stood in stark contrast to the
antiwar political speech in the act of draft card burning in O’Brien. In Young, two adult movie
theater owners challenged on First Amendment grounds Detroit’s zoning ordinance that
prevented concentration of adult businesses within a 1,000 feet of each other or within 500 feet
of any residential area.36
At the time of enactment, the Detroit city council made a finding that “some uses of
property are especially injurious to a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited
areas.”37 Based upon this legislative evidence, the city decided to pass the ordinance.
Subsequently, the city passed several amendments, the most important of which prevented
clusters of adult businesses from operating within a certain range of each other.38 The plaintiffs
argued that the recent amendments to the ordinance offended First Amendment protected speech
given that the ordinance aimed directly at movie theaters exhibiting sexually explicit films.39
The plaintiffs further argued that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as it applied restrictions to adult movie theaters only based on the
sexually explicit content of the films being shown at the theater.40
The Court upheld the ordinance and classified the land-use restriction as a contentneutral, constitutionally benign time, place, and manner regulation subject to intermediate
34

427 U.S. 50 (1976).
See Andrew, supra note 33, at 1183.
36
Young, 427 U.S. at 52–53.
37
Id. at 54.
38
Id. at 53.
39
Id. at 55.
40
Id. at 57.
35
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scrutiny.41 Writing for the plurality, Justice Stevens concluded that “[t]he mere fact that the
commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and
other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.”42 The
fact that the ordinance treated adult theaters differently and classified them based on the content
they exhibited also proved to be of little consequence to the plurality.43 Justice Stevens
distinguished the regulatory aims from the regulatory means of the ordinance.44 The plurality
concluded that land-use regulations governing the time, location, and manner of operations
pertaining to a particular kind of business does not violate the First Amendment if the city can
demonstrate a significant governmental interest in combating purported secondary effects
produced by operation of these adult businesses.45
Secondary effects became the constitutional end-run around persuasive arguments raised
in Justice Stewart’s dissent that adult zoning regulated adult businesses for its content above all
and that secondary effects obfuscated a clear distinction between content-based and contentneutral ordinances.46 Accordingly, Justice Stewart argued that adult zoning constituted contentbased regulation that demanded subjection to strict scrutiny.47 Justice Powell’s concurrence, on
the other hand, agreed with the plurality on content-neutrality, but viewed the ordinance as
regulating the conduct of how adult movie theaters operate in a community.48 Thus, the
ordinance, under Justice Powell’s analysis, should be analyzed under the four-part O’Brien test.49
The plurality passed on the O’Brien test and applied the significant governmental interest
standard as the constitutional benchmark that cities must prove to sustain an adult zoning
41

Id. at 61.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 67.
45
Id. at 61.
46
Id. at 83–87.
47
Id. at 85–86.
48
Id. at 78–83.
49
Id. at 80.
42

8

regulation.50 The city’s interest in protecting its community from negative externalities
generated by concentrations of adult movie theaters cloaked the ordinance in a content-neutral
garb free from the glare of strict scrutiny.51 The plurality further concluded that the findings of
the Detroit city council’s study provided a sufficient factual basis “for the [city council’s]
conclusion that this kind of restriction will have the desired effect.52 The study findings of
purported secondary effects, in other words, proved the city’s significant interest in preserving
the quality of neighborhoods in the community through zoning regulation of adult businesses. 53
The plurality in Young created several key components of the undeveloped evidence
standard that would confront the Alameda Court years later: Judicial deference to legislative
evidence,54 data proffered from legislative studies to support secondary effects,55 the notion of
secondary effects as a doctrinal basis for characterizing zoning ordinances as content neutral,56
and the city’s burden of proving a significant interest to sustain the constitutionality of the
ordinance.57 The plurality decision in Young, however, confounded the lower courts.58 Lower
courts struggled to articulate a clear standard of review as the doctrinal breadth and evidentiary
scope of the secondary effects justification clouded hitherto starker distinctions between contentbased and content-neutral ordinances.59 Justice Powell’s characterization of time, place, and

50

Id. at 70–72.
Id. at 70.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 71; see also Andrew, supra note 33, at 1184.
54
Id. at 71.
55
Id. at 71 n.34.
56
Id. at 71.
57
Id. at 70–73.
58
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1186.
59
Ronald M. Stein, Regulation of Adult Businesses Through Zoning After Renton, 18 PAC. L.J. 351, 361 (1987)
(noting that “‘the lack of a clearly articulated standard in Stevens’ plurality decision’” confused lower courts causing
Justice Powell’s O’Brien analysis to be largely followed by federal courts)(quoting Purple Onion v. Jackson, 511 F.
Supp. 1207, 1226 (N.D. Ga. 1981)).
51
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manner regulations as conduct-based and his invocation of the O’Brien test only compounded
lower courts’ perplexity.60
Five years after Young, the Supreme Court in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim61
refined its secondary effects analysis and reigned in the seemingly expansive writ of zoning
authority over adult businesses.62 In Schad, two adult bookstore owners were criminally indicted
and convicted for violating a local zoning ordinance that banned all live entertainment as a
permitted use in a commercial zone.63 The owners challenged the ordinance as violative of their
rights of free expression under the First Amendment.64 The bookstore sold sexually explicit
books, magazines, and films.65 In 1973, the bookstore obtained an “amusement” license from
the Borough, permitting the store to install coin-operated video booths in which customers could
pay to watch adult films on the commercial retail premises.66 Three years later, in 1976, the
store installed a coin-operated live nude dancing booth in which customers could pay to view a
live nude dancer gyrating behind a glass panel.67
The Schad Court attacked the blatant ambiguity in the language of the statute and its
application. Borough officials’ conflicting interpretation of the extent of entertainment banned
under the ordinance highlighted the ambiguity.68 The prosecutor construed the ordinance as
banning all live entertainment, but the Borough building inspector “stated there was no basis for
60

Id. at 361.
452 U.S. 61 (1981).
62
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187.
63
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62–64 (1981). § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim’s ordinance listed
permitted uses on land and in buildings. The list included: offices, banks, taverns, restaurants, luncheonettes,
automobile dealerships, and retail stores, “such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics,
hardware, lumber, jewelry paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers” . . . etc. Id. at 64. The list did not expressly
mention exclusion of sexually oriented retail businesses. Id. As Justice White points out in the plurality opinion,
the language of the ordinance is “ambiguous with respect to whether live entertainment is permitted.” Id. at 66. The
ordinance purports to list the “principal” permitted uses in a commercial zone, yet at the same time in a subsequent
provision of the ordinance § 99-4 “declares that all uses not expressly permitted are forbidden.” Id. at 67.
64
Id. at 65.
65
Id. at 62.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 68.
61
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distinguishing between live entertainment and other entertainment under the ordinance.”69 The
Borough issued the amusement license to the adult bookstore, which permitted the live
entertainment toll booths in the first place.70
The Court seized upon the ordinance’s ambiguity to raise the evidentiary burden upon
states to prove a substantial governmental interest.71 The Schad Court expounded upon the
rough outlines of the evidentiary standard in Young. First, the Court acknowledged that the
courts assumed the critical role of weigh the circumstances and appraising the “substantiality of
the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.”72 Second, the Court required the government
to provide evidence of the secondary effects that the ordinance purported to mitigate before the
law could survive intermediate scrutiny.73 Third, overbroad zoning regulations that operated as
either an express or an effective total ban on expressive speech constituted an unreasonable time,
place, and manner regulation.74 On this point, the Court added that zoning regulations
implicating First Amendment rights must be narrowly tailored or drawn to further the state’s
substantial governmental interest and leave open “adequate alternative channels of
communication.”75

69

Id.
Id. at 62.
71
Id. at 68.
72
Id. at 69.
73
Id. at 69–75.
74
Id. at 74–76.
75
Id. at 75–76; see also Matthew L. McGinnis, Note, Sex, But Not the City: Adult-Entertainment Zoning, The First
Amendment, and Residential and Rural Municipalities, 46 B.C. L. REV. 625, 648–54 (2005) (making the astute
observation that an alternative fair reading of Schad suggests that a total ban may “still be permissible in rural and
residential communities” since the Court “explicitly declined to hold that every municipality, no matter how small,
must allow such entertainment.”). The author notes “an unresolved conflict” between Renton and Schad regarding
the available alternative avenues of communication requirement. Renton requires that municipal zoning regulations
provide space for adult businesses within the city’s borders. Schad suggests, on the other hand, that small rural or
residential communities may not have to preserve zoning space within its borders to meet the alternative avenues
communication when other adult businesses are nearby but outside the municipality’s borders. Id. at 654. This
unclear standard for available alternative avenues of communication requirement is an important component of First
Amendment zoning jurisprudence, but beyond the scope of this note.
70

11

Justice Blackmun’s concurrence amplified the plurality’s articulation of the state’s
heightened evidentiary burden.76 The state must be prepared, Justice Blackmun wrote, “to
articulate, and support, a reasoned and significant basis for its decision.”77 Further, the city
cannot rely on access to adult businesses in neighboring locales to satisfy the court’s concern
with available alternative avenues of communication.78
Justice Stevens, the plurality opinion author in Young, wrote a concurrence in Schad that
shed new and interesting light in terms of the city’s evidentiary burden under Young and the
constitutional parameters of how a state may justify future assertions of restrictive zoning
authority over adult businesses.79 In particular, Justice Stevens’ concurrence zeros in on the
content-neutrality issue that raised analytical difficulties for lower courts in applying Young.80
Narrowly tailored or drawn regulations, Justice Stevens’ argument implicitly acknowledged,
reigned in the issue of overbroad ordinances, but also raised the opposite issue of ordinances
narrowly drawn on the basis of content.81
The Borough could overcome over breadth charges by “showing that its ordinances were
narrowly drawn and furthered ‘a sufficiently substantial governmental interest.’”82 Justice
Stevens reasoned further that both the ambiguous ordinance language and a destitute evidentiary
record demonstrating that the adult business created an “identifiable adverse impact on the
neighborhood or on the Borough as a whole” proved fatal to the ordinance’s constitutional
validity.83 The municipal regulation could be sustained, in other words, if the ordinance
language is clear and narrowly focused on mitigating asserted secondary effects, the existence of

76

Schad, 452 U.S. at 77.
Id.
78
Id. at 78.
79
Id. at 79.
80
Id. at 83–84.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 79.
83
Id. at 83.
77
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which is supported by evidence. “Unbridled discretion of a municipal official” did not satisfy
the evidentiary burden created in Young and refined in Schad.84
The Schad Court left it up to subsequent courts to elaborate on the type or amount of
evidence that either the government or the plaintiffs could adduce at trial. Young and Schad
marked a clear swing of the pendulum.85 States could use its zoning power to regulate adult
businesses without the presumption of content-discrimination if the government premised its
ordinance on ameliorating alleged secondary effects or negative externalities produced by
operation of adult businesses.86 States could not, on the other hand, simply ban all adult
businesses from a commercial district or merely assert that the ordinance combated secondary
effects and pass constitutional muster.87 The state must produce evidence.88 Part of that
evidentiary burden included clear ordinance language that corresponded to proffered evidence of
secondary effects, which rooted the ordinance’s legitimacy in a significant governmental
interest.89
Lower courts heeded Schad’s tougher evidentiary burden on the government.90 The
Eighth and Sixth Circuits in particular read the Supreme Court’s Schad opinion as a heightened
evidentiary standard for proving that the ordinance aimed at combating secondary effects caused
by the adult business location and not the content of the speech itself.91 Lower courts also
scrutinized the government’s motivation in passing the ordinance as a factor in their evidentiary

84

Id. at 84.
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187.
86
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc, 427 U.S. 50, 52–53 (1976).
87
Schad, 452 U.S. at 75–76.
88
Id. at 76.
89
Id. at 76.
90
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1187–88.
91
See Avalon v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding that the ordinance was content-based and
subject to strict scrutiny because the state produced insufficient evidence to justify a local dispersal ordinance
similar to the one in Young); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657 F.2d 94, 97 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding
that the ordinance was content-based for lack of sufficient evidence that the regulation aimed at combating
purported secondary effects).
85
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analysis in the wake of Schad.92 Lower courts clearly interpreted Schad as sculpting reinforced
evidentiary boundaries out of a vague and confusing mold in Young.
The disparate application of the evidentiary burden among lower courts, however,
reflected the competing interests that the Supreme Court enlisted itself to balance in Schad.93
Without a clear framework in hand, two different circuits could view an identically worded
ordinance but reach opposite conclusions in light of how a particular court interpreted the
evidence offered by the government.94 Elements of the Court’s evidence standard for proving a
significant governmental interest were taking shape. The Supreme Court utilized its subsequent
decision in Renton to reign in lower courts’ analysis of the government’s motivation in
enactment of an adult zoning ordinance and to translate the Young and Schad decisions into a
coherent framework of analysis.95
If Schad constituted an increase in the government’s evidentiary burden, the Supreme
Court’s decision in City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc.96 abruptly dispelled that
interpretation.97 The Renton Court’s opinion set to accomplish three objectives: clarification of
its secondary effects rationale in Young, foreclosure of the government’s motivation in enacting
the ordinance as a factor in lower courts’ analysis, and clear consensus articulation of the proper

92

Andrew, supra note 33, at 1189. Compare Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203, 1206 (5th Cir. 1982)
(finding that the legislative history of the ordinance revealed “the city’s motive was to remove [the] adult theater
from the vicinity of an opera house because of apprehension that an adult theater would drive patrons away,” which
“did not support the [the city’s] claim that it was motivated by the crime and blight problem”), with Grand Faloon
Tavern, Inc. v. Wicker, 670 F.2d 943, 949 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that nature of evidence presented by the city to
the district, including a police chief report citing numerous complaints and incidents of prostitution, assaults, acts of
indecent exposure, and rape at the adult business establishment, justified the city ordinance banning nude dancing in
places selling alcohol).
93
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1188. Compare the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Basiardanes with the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Young. As the author noted, the ordinance in Basiardanes “textually mirrored the ordinance
upheld in Young.” Id. at 1189, n.93. The Basiardanes Court distinguished the dispersal ordinance at issue with the
ordinance in Young. Id. The Court found that the ordinance dispersed adult theaters in “the most unattractive,
inaccessible, and inconvenient areas of the city,” thereby effectively cutting off adequate alternative channels of
communication. Id.
94
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1189.
95
Id. at 1191.
96
106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
97
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1192.
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formulation of the government’s evidentiary burden that proved elusive in the Court’s Young and
Schad opinions.98
In Renton, two adult theater owners challenged the City of Renton’s preexisting zoning
ordinance that prohibited any adult motion picture theater from “locating within 1,000 feet of
any residential zone, single-, or multiple-family dwelling, church, or park, and within one mile of
any school.”99 The City Council predicated its decision to pass the dispersal ordinance upon
several modes of informational evidence. The ordinance became law after several public
hearings, review of data from other cities regarding the negative externalities of adult businesses
upon the community, and a recommendation to pass the ordinance from both the City Attorney’s
Office and the city’s Planning and Development Committee.100 The ordinance defined adult
movie theaters broadly to include “ ‘[a]n enclosed building used for preventing motion picture
films, video cassettes, cable television, or any other such visual media, distinguished or
[characterized] by an emphasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to ‘specified sexual
activities’ or ‘specified anatomical areas’…for observation by patrons therein.’”101
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, wasted no time establishing the Renton
ordinance as identical in language, scope, and constitutional character with the dispersal zoning
law in Young.102 Drawing a direct analogy with Young’s ordinance set the stage for the Renton
Court’s amplified explanation of the proper constitutional analysis of time, place, and manner
regulations. First, the ordinance is properly analyzed as a time, place, and manner regulation
since it do not ban adult theaters altogether, but merely places restrictions on how, where, and
when the adult theater can operate.103 The time, place, and manner character of the Renton
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ordinance made it content-neutral subject to intermediate scrutiny, the Court explained, provided
the government could show that the design of a given ordinance served “a substantial
governmental interest and allow[ed] for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.”104
This formulation addressed both the significant governmental interest prong in Young and the
narrow tailoring requirement in Schad.
Second, the Court next addressed the sufficiency of evidence burden upon the
government for proving a substantial governmental interest.105 Relying on its secondary effects
rationale in Young, the majority in Renton accorded “high respect” or high judicial deference to
legislative attempts to combat asserted secondary effects of adult businesses in the form of
restrictive zoning laws.106 City governments, the Court elaborated, must have “a reasonable
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.”107 The Court
dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the city’s “justifications for the ordinance were
‘conclusory and speculative’ since the Renton ordinance was passed “without the benefit of
studies specifically relating to ‘the particular problems or needs of Renton.’”108
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Renton, concluded that the state “was
entitled to rely on the experiences of Seattle and other cities, and in particular on the ‘detailed
findings’ summarized in the Washington Supreme Court’s Northend Cinema opinion, in
104
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enacting its adult theater zoning ordinance.”109 The First Amendment, the Court added, “does
not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new studies or produce evidence
independent of that already generated by other cities.”110 The next line etched Renton’s evidence
standard into First Amendment zoning jurisprudence: “so long as whatever evidence the city
relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses.”111
Reliance, reasonableness, and relevance became the flashpoints of confusion and debate among
the lower courts as to the extent of evidence sufficient to “justify reliance by a city and support a
reasonable belief that the ordinance targeted secondary effects.”112
The Renton Court’s decision, put another way, constituted a constitutional patchwork of
prongs from Young and Schad with an inchoate sufficiency of evidence standard that, on its face,
appeared to permit all manner of evidence a city government could proffer in the name of
combating secondary effects. The Renton Court extended the secondary effects reasoning in
Young by holding that a city may rely on the studies of other cities, or detailed findings in
judicial opinions from other courts, as opposed to conducting its own studies.113
Young’s secondary effects doctrine became an evidentiary proxy for proving a substantial
governmental interest under Renton.114 Government could cherry pick bias, and in some cases
wholly distinguishable and irrelevant, data to support its justification for passing the
ordinance.115 More to the point, Justice Brennan’s dissent also zeroed in on the fact that some of
the findings in the government’s evidence “do not relate to supposed ‘secondary effects’
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associated with adult movie theaters.”116 Besides reliance on incomparable evidence, the Court,
Justice Brennan insisted, “cannot, as it does, merely accept these post hoc statements at face
value.”117 Citing to Schad, Justice Brennan’s argument strongly indicated that the narrow
tailoring requirement in Schad demanded that governments adduce evidence comparable, or at
the very least, related to, the purported secondary effects that the ordinance aimed to mitigate.118
Before giving a plaintiff the opportunity to challenge the government’s evidence or to
offer evidence in front of a jury, the Renton Court, ironically, concludes that courts are in the
best position to judge whether a particular plaintiff-adult business lodges sufficient legal
arguments to strike down a particular city’s zoning ordinance under an intermediate standard of
scrutiny, which “reduces a city’s burden to justify its regulation.”119
In the wake of Renton’s expansive evidence rule, some lower courts imposed certain
minimum requirements on official in city government such as the requirement that the
government can rely only on data or evidence utilized before the ordinance’s enactment.120
Other lower courts enforced Renton’s evidence standard with full force, holding that the
government can rely on evidence or date obtained before or after the ordinance’s passage.121
This nascent timing of evidence issue remains an unresolved legal issue even after the Court’s
decision in Alameda.
116
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The third and final major legal issue that the Renton Court addressed turned on whether
an adult zoning ordinance was intrinsically content-based. Armed with the Schad Court’s
narrow tailoring requirement as caution against overbroad ordinances, lower courts increasingly
considered the government’s motivation in passing an adult business ordinance.122 This
motivation factor clearly reflected lower court concerns that content-based restrictions could be
easily justified as content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations combating alleged
secondary effects.
Justice Brennan’s dissent in Renton gave superior judicial voice to that consideration.
Justice Brennan wrote incisively that even if the ordinance legitimately aimed at combating real
secondary effects, it does not necessarily “mean, however, that such regulations are contentneutral.”123 The fact the ordinances are directed at legitimate legislative aims does not change
the fact that government passes ordinances imposing special restrictions because of the speech
content, not in spite of it.124 Justice Brennan’s constitutional sentiments echoed the Ninth
Circuit’s position that the city’s could not rely on unrelated data from other studies of cities with
different problems and needs from Renton to prove a governmental interest.
The majority in Renton disagreed with Justice Brennan and the Ninth Circuit. The Court
dismissed the Ninth Circuit’s O’Brien analysis regarding the city’s motivation as a factor in
determining whether the ordinance is content-neutral.125 The majority concluded that alleged
legislative motives created an unfair and unjustifiably high threshold for city governments to
overcome.126 Therefore, the Court adopted the “predominate concerns”127 test as a buffer against
lower court analysis of governmental motivations in passing an ordinance. This way the
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ordinance would pass constitutional muster under the O’Brien test, even if suppression of speech
was a motivating factor in the ordinance’s enactment provided the governments predominate
concerns were secondary effects and not the speech content.128
The Renton Court may have foreclosed governmental motivation as a decisive factor but
failed to blunt Justice Brennan’s cogent legal counterpoint that zoning regulation of adult
businesses was inescapably based on the speech’s content irrespective of whether they aimed to
combat harmful secondary effects.129 In particular, Justice Brennan pointed out that ‘“other
forms of adult entertainment”’ were not subject to the same restrictions as adult movie theaters
under the Renton ordinance.130 This disparate treatment of particular kinds of speech amounted
to flagrant content-discrimination, requiring strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review for
zoning regulations of sexual communicative conduct.131 In Young, the Supreme Court jettisoned
disentanglement of the thorny distinction between the conduct and speech components of
symbolic expression.132 On this point, the Renton Court only convinced critics that the conductcontent based distinction issue would remain unresolved.
Five years later the Court aggressively upended the conduct-content based distinction but
outside the zoning context in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.133 The Barnes line of cases involved a
distinct breed of conduct regulation of adult businesses. In Barnes, the Indiana State Legislature
sought to enforce its public indecency statute against two strip clubs that featured totally nude
dancing and served alcohol.134 The indecency statute required “that the dancers wear ‘pasties’
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and ‘G-strings’ when they dance.”135 The two strip club owners challenged the statute on the
grounds that prohibiting the performance of nude dancing impermissibly infringed on their First
Amendment rights in symbolic expression.136 In addition, the strip club respondents carefully
distinguished between time, place, and manner restrictions on adult businesses and government
imposed limits on conduct that qualifies as symbolic expression protected by the First
Amendment.137
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, analyzed the statute under the O’Brien
test, noting that the Renton test embodied “much the same standards as those set forth in
[O’Brien].”138 On that doctrinal basis, the plurality concluded that the Indiana statute fell within
the purview of state police power to protect morality and the public order.139 Conduct statutes
designed to mitigate the harmful effects of conduct that threatened the public order or morality
justifiably placed incidental curbs on symbolic expression.140 This reasoning mirrored the broad
secondary effects pretext on which the government could rely in passage of zoning regulation of
adult businesses.141 Instead of elucidating the boundary line between conduct and content in
symbolic expression, the Barnes plurality expanded the scope of the secondary effects doctrine
into unprecedented legal terrain—the non-zoning context.142 The Barnes decision empowered
states with the constitutional authority to directly regulate conduct in adult businesses

135

Id.
Id. at 566.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 570–72.
140
Id. See also Kevin Case, Note, “Lewd and Immoral”: Nude Dancing, Sexual Expression, and the First
Amendment, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1185, 1192–95 (2006) (arguing that conduct statutes regulating nude dancing
specifically requires “the same level of judicial scrutiny applied to political speech” because public sexual
expression is not low value, mere conduct speech). Moreover, the government’s evidentiary burden to substantiate
conduct based statues is treated by the Barnes plurality as pro forma rather than a constitutional requirement with
teeth. Id. at 1193.
141
Andrew, supra note 33, at 1199–1200.
142
Id. at 1199.
136

21

irrespective of the free speech implications or of any burden of proof to substantiate the contentneutrality of the conduct statute.143
Justice Scalia’s concurrence agreed almost entirely with the plurality’s legal conclusions,
but differed on the proper standard of review.144 For Justice Scalia, nude dancing regulation not
only warranted state regulation, but also required judicial deference to legislative prerogatives.
The Court, Justice Scalia wrote, “should avoid wherever possible . . . a method of analysis that
requires judicial assessment of the ‘importance’ of government interests—and especially of
government interests in various aspects of morality.”145
Justice Souter’s concurrence, however, reached the same legal conclusion on different
grounds. Justice Souter assumed the more difficult analytical undertaking of responding to
Justice White’s dissenting point that public indecency statutes are inherently content-based, as
they are aimed to limit symbolic speech because of its content.146 Justice Souter countered with
two points. First, the nudity aspect of dance performance does not subtract from the expressive
communicative quality freely conveyed in that form of expression.147 Second, the fact that the
legislature’s rationale for passing the statute is correlated with effects generated by the existence
of adult businesses does not mean such statutes are content-based.148 If the regulation is
“‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’”149 in other words, the
statute is content-neutral. Justice Souter, citing to the Court’s reasoning in Renton, added that
under the O’Brien analysis the government’s evidentiary burden did not include an affirmative
obligation to prove the existence of secondary effects in its city in particular.150
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The Court’s subsequent opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul151 flew under the radar, as it
did not involve any state regulation of adult businesses. R.A.V. involved a constitutional
challenge to a statutory provision that criminalized derogatory verbal or symbolic speech aimed
at persons “‘on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.’”152 Writing for the plurality,
Justice Scalia struck down the statute, but a kernel of his reasoning implicated First Amendment
concerns for state regulation of adult businesses.153 Justice Scalia concluded that the government
could not discriminate against particular kinds of proscribable speech and not others.154 For our
purposes, Justice Scalia reasoned that secondary effects provided a valid basis on which to
classify certain speech as containing proscribable content.155 Therefore, the government could
pass regulations that constitutionally discriminate against particular kinds of speech carrying
negative secondary effects “because of their constitutionally proscribable content.”156
The expansion of secondary effects reached its apogee in R.A.V. Justice Scalia’s
reasoning suggested that speech producing harmful secondary effects was tantamount to other
categories of speech not afforded First Amendment protections such as libel and obscenity.157
To be fair, Justice Scalia may not have meant that speech engendering secondary effects
constituted a new category of unprotected speech. The thrust of his reasoning, however, strongly
indicated that courts should treat conduct and zoning state regulations of adult businesses as a
category receiving no First Amendment protection.158 Although the Court refused to take the
secondary effects reasoning as far as denying the protected status of adult speech,159 the Court’s

151

505 U.S. 377 (1992) (quoting Minn. Stat. § 292.02 (1990)).
Id. at 380.
153
Id. at 381.
154
Id. at 383–84.
155
Id. at 389.
156
Id. at 383.
157
Id. at 385–94.
158
Hudson, supra note 113, at 82–83.
159
See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 62, 66 (1981); see also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 565 (1991).
152

23

vague evidence rule in Renton and the expansion of secondary effects into non-zoning cases
suggested the Court’s willingness to permit the state expansive power to regulate adult
businesses with feeble limitations.160
The Court retrenched its secondary effects analysis in non-zoning cases eight years later
in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.161 The facts of Erie were virtually identical to Barnes. In Erie, a
strip club owner operating a nude dancing club challenged a Pennsylvania Ordinance enacted by
the City of Erie.162 The ordinance required dancers to wear, “at a minimum, ‘pasties’ and a ‘Gstring.’”163 The language of the ordinance broadly encompassed any nudity in public places,
which included “all buildings and enclosed places owned by or open to the general public,…such
places of entertainment, taverns, restaurants, clubs, theaters, dance halls, banquet halls, party
rooms or halls limited to specific members, restricted to adults or to patrons invited to attend,
whether or not an admission charge is levied.”164
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, amplified the secondary effects analysis
nascent in Barnes.165 The Erie plurality referenced the facts of O’Brien throughout the opinion
to demonstrate that if the Court curbed anti-war political speech in the name of furthering a
governmental interest, the Court refused to carve out an exception for nude dancing in strip
clubs, which is lower value symbolic expression.166 Justice O’Connor held further that the
government’s evidentiary burden for proving whether the regulation furthers an important
governmental interest is judged under the broad Renton reasonable-relevance standard.167 The
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plurality in Erie essentially applied the opaque evidence rule from its analysis in Young, Schad,
and Renton to non-zoning statutes in Barnes and Erie.168
For evidence purposes, Barnes and Erie failed to mark a watershed moment in the
Court’s clarification of the evidence rule established in Renton.169 The opinions, however,
represented a significant doctrinal expansion of the secondary effects justification in the state’s
ability to directly regulate expressive conduct as well as time, place, and manner of operation of
adult businesses.170 Furthermore, although silent in expounding on the meaning of the Renton
evidence rule, the Barnes, R.A.V., and Erie decisions highlighted the integral part that a clear
evidence rule plays in protecting the First Amendment rights of adult speech from potent
governmental power.
Interestingly, Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Erie alluded to this same concern.
Justice Souter sharply disagreed with the plurality’s legal conclusions because “the record before
us today is deficient in its failure to reveal any evidence on which Erie may have relied, either
for the seriousness of the threatened harm or for the efficacy of its chosen remedy.”171 The
plurality, in other words, rubber stamped the Erie City Council’s “speculative supposition”
without the benefit of any “demonstrated fact.”172 Justice Souter’s opinion underscored the
meekness that opacity produced in the Renton evidence rule, and the need to clarify the rule to
protect adult businesses’ protected speech.
III.

The Unclear Evidentiary Standard for Proving Substantial Governmental
Interest: Alameda Books
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The Supreme Court’s renewed opportunity to squarely and directly address the vague
Renton evidence rule arrived in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books173 three years after Erie
and seventeen years after Renton. In Alameda, two adult business owners operating two
businesses—an arcade and bookstore— in a single building unit challenged the revised
ordinance that the operation of more than one adult business in the same building.174 The Ninth
Circuit Court, much as it did in Renton, concluded that the city failed to “demonstrate that the
prohibition was designed to serve a substantial governmental interest.”175 In particular, the Ninth
Circuit found that the city failed to adduce sufficient evidence on which it could reasonably rely
to “demonstrate a link between multiple-use adult establishments and negative secondary
effects.”176
The Alameda Court produced another plurality opinion split in their approach to the
government’s evidentiary burden for proving a substantial governmental interest. The opinions
can be categorized into three competing approaches. First, Justice O’Connor, writing for the
plurality, articulated a burden-shifting mechanism in which plaintiff-adult businesses could “cast
direct doubt” on the government’s adduced evidence supporting its secondary effects
justification.177 Plaintiffs casted direct doubt on the city’s rationale “by demonstrating that the
municipality’s evidence does not support its rationale, or by furnishing evidence that disputes the
municipality’s factual findings.”178 If the plaintiff fails to cast direct doubt, the government
satisfies the Renton reasonable-relevance standard.179
If the plaintiff succeeds, on the other hand, in casting direct doubt on the government’s
rationale, the burden shifts back to the government to offer additional evidence “renewing
173
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support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”180 Justice O’Connor reinforced, however, the
Court’s holding in Renton that the government’s evidentiary burden did not include conducting
its own empirical studies.181
Further, the government’s evidentiary burden also excluded “providing evidence that
rules out every theory for the link between concentrations of adult establishments that is
inconsistent with its own.”182 The plurality also stated that the government could rely on
evidence obtained after the original ordinance passed but preceded revision of the ordinance.183
Besides the burden shifting mechanism, the plurality also provided that a municipality could not
rely on “shoddy data or reasoning” to support its rationale.184
The plurality’s evidence formulation is flawed in three key respects. First, the burden
shifting mechanism remained silent as to how courts should weigh the plaintiff’s rebuttal
evidence casting direct doubt on the government’s rationale. More importantly, the plurality also
failed to address the type or form of evidence that a plaintiff could adduce to cast direct doubt
upon the government’s rationale. The plaintiff’s evidentiary burden on rebuttal, in other words,
remained unclear.
Second, the timing of evidence on which the government could not rely was left
unresolved by the plurality. No less than the scope of permissible evidence was at stake. The
plurality deficient explanation did not articulate a clear timeline of evidence. The government
could clearly rely on pre-enactment evidence, but how far back and did older evidence or data
carry less evidentiary weight than fresher evidence or data. Moreover, the plurality failed to
address whether the government could rely on evidence or data obtained after enactment of the
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ordinance. Similarly, even if the government could rely on post-enactment evidence or data, the
degree of evidentiary weight to be accorded different evidence over time was unclear.
Third, the “shoddy data or reasoning” requirement raised a hullabaloo of disagreement
and confusion regarding what the requirement actually meant.185 The plurality created a
category without explaining the criteria for qualification or disqualification. At the very least,
the Court seemed to suggest that “shoddy data or reasoning” included evidence completely
unrelated to the purported secondary effects ailing the particular community. Suggestions of
law, however, compounded an already unclear evidence rule.
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion sought to clarify how courts should properly
measure the government’s evidentiary burden. Justice Kennedy formulized a cost-benefit
approach or balancing test that weighed whether a given ordinance substantially reduced speech
in the name of mitigating secondary effects.186 Justice Kennedy predicated this approach on two
legal questions. First, “what proposition does a city need to advance in order to sustain a
secondary effects ordinance?”187 Second, “how much evidence is required to support the
proposition?”188 On the appropriate proposition, Justice Kennedy concluded that “a city must
advance some basis to show that its regulation has the purpose and effect of suppressing
secondary effects, while leaving the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact.” 189
This formulation aimed to address the encroaching and enlarging scope of acceptable
evidence on which governments could rely to substantiate their secondary effects justification.
Justice Kennedy’s cost-benefit approach, in other words, sought to reign in governmental
reliance on thinly veiled attempts at overt regulation without strong evidentiary support. The
broadening scope of admissible evidence, no matter how unrelated, began to water down the
185
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purpose of having an evidence rule. The problem with Justice Kennedy’s formulation, however,
is that reads more like a template for writing ordinance language that will more likely overcome
constitutional challenges.
On the second proposition, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence falls way short. The
sufficiency of evidence that the government must produce, Justice Kennedy insists, is explained
in the Renton rule. The Court must accorded broad judicial deference to legislative rationale.
Citing to Renton and similar to Justice Scalia’s position in Barnes, Justice Kennedy wrote, [a]s a
general matter, courts should not be in the business of second-guessing fact-bound empirical
assessments of city planners. The Los Angeles City Council knows the streets of Lose Angeles
better than we do.”
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is defective in two key aspects. First, the concurrence
conflates the sufficiency of asserting a related secondary effect with sufficiency of evidence in
proving a substantial governmental interest. The cost-benefit approach is a reformulation of the
narrow tailoring requirement in Schad. Second, the concurring opinion, similarly, punted on the
question of the timing of evidence, the weight of evidence, the type or form of admissible
evidence, and how much evidence is sufficient to defeat an ordinance.
Justice Souter’s dissent makes two critical points regarding sufficiency of evidence.
First, Justice Souter begins on the premise that zoning regulation of adult businesses is “contentcorrelated.” Zoning regulations of adult businesses, in other words, have a “correlation with
secondary effects.” Second, as such, the sufficiency of evidence standard should also require a
correlation between the purported secondary effects in a community and the particular type of
operation of adult businesses in the community that gives rise to these alleged secondary effects.

IV.

An Unclear Evidentiary Standard Emboldens Invasive State Zoning Regulation
In the Spirit of Barnes and Erie
29

In the wake of Alameda’s unclear evidence standard, lower courts and commentators are
split over what constitutes sufficient evidence to sustain or rebut the substantial governmental
interest prong under Renton. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Daytona Grand, Inc. v.
City of Daytona Beach,190 for example, reversed the District Court’s finding that the city relied
heavily on “pre-enactment evidence [consisting] either of purely anecdotal evidence or opinions
based on highly unreliable data.”191 The District Court construed Alameda’s “shoddy data or
reasoning” sufficiency of evidence standard to exclude anecdotal evidence such as reliance on
testimony from past and present law enforcement officials and appropriately comparable control
studies for secondary effects.192
The Eleventh Circuit sharply disagreed with the lower court’s reading of Alameda,
explaining that the Alameda Court did not raise the evidentiary bar “or [require] a city to justify
its ordinances with empirical evidence or scientific studies.”193 The Daytona Court concluded
further that anecdotal evidence sufficiently sustains an adult ordinance and that empirical studies
are not required as part of the city’s evidentiary burden under Alameda.194
The Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence has paralleled the Eleventh Circuit’s view on
sufficiency of evidence until its most recent 2009 decision in Annex Books v. City of
Indianapolis.195 In Annex, Judge Easterbrook, writing for the majority measured the city’s
sufficiency of evidence under Justice Kennedy’s cost-benefit approach. The revised ordinance
expanded the amount of retail stores subject to zoning regulation as adult businesses.196 The
ordinance increased the number of retail stores by decreasing the threshold of adult material
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inventory sold in the store necessary to come within the statute’s scope.197 Judge Easterbrook
soundly rejected the government’s position that “any empirical study of morals offenses near any
kind of adult establishment in any city justifies every possible kind of legal restriction in every
city.”198 The Annex Court, in other words, rejected the city’s reading of Alameda that any and
every study from other cities qualified as sufficient evidence.
The Annex decision reflected the Seventh Circuit’s concern that city governments would
read Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Alameda as a template for writing proper language in the
ordinance to support its rationale and pass constitutional muster. Annex represents a yield sign
more than a stop sign about the scope of evidence on which governments may rely to support its
rationale under Alameda.

V.

Not All Secondary Effects Are Created or Equal: Establishing Rules of Comparability In
Alameda Books Evidence Standard
The Alameda evidence standard should adopt a rule of comparability standard regarding

the sufficiency of evidence on which the government may rely. A recent study conducted an
empirical comparison of purported secondary effects and the purported results produced in the
community.199 Justice Souter and Judge Easterbrook’s opinions in Alameda and Annex,
respectively, lay out the blueprint for an evidence standard that reign the broad scope of
unrelated evidence on which the government may rely. The government should not shoulder the
burden of producing new empirical studies of its own. But the government should be required to
adduce evidence that tracks closely with the type of secondary effects its ordinance is designed
to combat. This rule of comparable data or evidence as a requirement for sufficient evidence
balances the interests of the government in protecting the community from actual negative
197

Id. at 462.
Id. at 464.
199
See Daniel Linz, Bryant Paul, and Mike Z. Yao, Peep Show Establishments, Police Activity, Public Place, and
Time: A Study of Secondary Effects in San Diego, 43 J. SEX RESEARCH 2, 190 (2006).
198

31

externalities produced by operation of adult businesses near schools or churches against the First
Amendment speech rights of adult business owners.

VI.

Conclusion
The United States Supreme Court has steadily expanded the writ of state and municipal

regulatory authority over adult businesses.200 In its wake, the Court’s decisions defanged First
Amendment protections of adult businesses, conflated the applicability of the secondary effects
doctrine in non-zoning cases, and confused lower courts’ understanding of the proper evidentiary
burden for proving a substantial governmental interest. Judicial expansion of state and municipal
regulatory power over adult businesses has increasingly paved the way for legislative morality as
states began passage of conduct statutes aimed at the sexual content adult businesses are
selling.201 A more balanced and efficient regulatory approach contemplates rules of comparable
relatedness when it comes to the government’s evidentiary burden for proving a substantial
governmental interest.
Rules of comparable relatedness can narrow the inconsistency in lower court
interpretations of Alameda’s evidence standard which has become the basis for legislative abuse
in adult zoning regulation. Protection of our families and communities is an essential legislative
prerogative. But protection must be proportional to the threat and the threat must be fairly
measured by a clear evidence standard that does not transform protection of the community into
a legislative license to oppress First Amendment protected speech to which adult businesses are
entitled.
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